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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
None are applicable.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(j) (1953, as
amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court err under Rule 47(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in

awarding each defendant three peremptory challenges? The Utah Supreme Court has held that
"the trial court should have limited discretion in its Rule 47(c) decisions." Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 353 (Utah 1997 (quotation omitted). On "the spectrum of discretion .
. ., running from 'de novo' on the one hand to 'broad discretion' on the other, the appropriate
discretion on this issue lies close to, although probably not at, the 4de novo' end." Id
2.

Should a new trial or a McDonomh hearing have been granted to determine

whether one or more jurors hid their bias against awarding pain and suffering damages? The

1

The Appellant also raises the following issues on appeal, but did not include them in her
Statement of Issues.
1.
Did the trial court err in not allowing Mrs. Walker to call Dr. Sawchuck to testify?
2.
Did the trial court err in allowing Dr. Stephen Marble to testify to matters regarding
causation?

1

Utah Supreme Court has held that review of the trial court's denial of a Motion for a New Trial
falls under an "abuse of discretion" standard. State v Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992)
3.

Did the trial court err in summarily granting a subrogation claim to reduce the

judgment awarded by the jury? This issue is not applicable to Defendants, Potkins and RT
Systems.
4.

Did the trial court erroneously award defendant, Hansen, her taxable costs

incurred before her offer of judgment? This issue is not applicable to Defendants, Potkins and
RT Systems.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This personal injury action arose out of an automobile accident that occurred July 28,

1997, at approximately 5:30 p.m.. The Appellant, Sandra Walker, was a passenger in an
automobile owned and operated by Appellee, Mary Hansen. Ms. Hansen, age 93, was traveling
westbound on 1-215, in the far left lane, when she realized she had missed the airport exit. Ms.
Hansen then moved from the far left lane to the far right lane, which was occupied by Appellee,
Jeffrey Potkins, and then came to a complete stop in the right lane. Mr. Potkins was unable to
stop the tractor/trailer he was driving and rear-ended Ms. Hansen's automobile.
B.

The Course of Proceedings
This case was tried to a jury on October 10, 12, and 13, 2000. In its verdict, the jury

concluded that Ms. Hansen was 100% liable for the accident and that Mr. Potkins and R.T.
2

Systems were not liable, at all, for the accident. The jury awarded Mrs. Walker $30,000 in
damages. Mrs. Walker subsequently filed a Request for New Trail, or in the alternative, Request
for Additur, which the trial court denied. The trial court then subtracted $10,000fromthe
judgment accounting for Personal Injury Protection benefits previously made to Mrs. Walker,
awarded prejudgment interest on the net amount of special damages to Mrs. Walker, taxed costs
in favor of Mrs. Hansen and Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems. Thus, the Court entered judgment in
the amount of $20,648.45, in favor of Mrs. Walker against Ms. Hansen.
C.

Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal
1.

On February 5, 1999, Mrs. Walker filed a Complaint in Third Judicial District

Court, State of Utah. See, Complaint at Record 1-5 (hereinafter "R."). Mrs. Walker alleged that
Ms. Hansen's negligence caused the accident. R.3. Mrs. Walker alleged that as a result of the
accident, she suffered severe bodily injuries, substantial medical bills, and certain economic
damages. R.4. Floyd Walker, Mrs. Walker's husband, alleged that he suffered certain economic
damages and loss of consortium. Id Mr. Walker later dismissed his claims by stipulation.
R.940atl-2.
2.

On March 9,1999, Ms. Hansen filed her Answer alleging that Mr. Potkins was

negligent in causing or contributing to the accident. R. 12.
3.

On April 29, 1999, Mrs. Walker filed an Amended Complaint alleging that Mr.

Potkins and R.T. Systems, as Mr. Potkins' employer, were also negligent for causing the subject
accident. R. 19-21.
3

4.

On July 9, 1999. Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems answered Mrs. Walker's

Amended Complaint and denied all liability for the subject accident. R. 28-33.
5.

Prior to trial, Ms. Hansen, Mr. Potkins, and R.T. Systems, hired Dr. Stephen

Marble to address various causation and damages issues that were disputed by the parties. Dr.
Marble's report was provided to Mrs. Walker. R. 516-24.
6.

On October 5, 2000, Ms. Hansen filed a Motion in Limine, which sought among

other things, to establish the scope of Dr. Marble's trial testimony. R. 527. Ms. Hansen argued
that Dr. Marble should be able to testify regarding the causation for Mrs. Walker's disc
herniation because it was addressed in Dr. Marble's report. R. 537. Ms. Hansen further argued
that Mrs. Walker was aware of Ms. Hansen's intention to have Dr. Marble testify about causation
and had ample opportunity to question Dr. Marble about causation, but chose not to do so. Id..
7.

On October 10, 2000, the trial court heard counsels' arguments with respect to the

scope of Dr. Marble's testimony. R. 940 at 20-24. The court determined that with respect to the
issue of causation, Dr. Marble "can testify as to whatever he said in that report, but anything
raised much later on the issue, the issue to go beyond that it seems to me could be equally unfair
to the plaintiff." R. 940 at 25.
8.

At trial Ms. Hansen's counsel asked Dr. Marble for his expert medical opinion on

the significance of Mrs. Walker reporting no low back pain at the emergency room immediately
after the accident. R. 941 at 68. Mrs. Walker's counsel objected to the question as being beyond
the scope of Dr. Marble's report. R. 941 at 69. The court then heard counsels' arguments and
4

requested that Ms. Hansen's counsel demonstrate where in the report Dr. Marble discussed the
issue. R. 941 at 69-70. Ms. Hansen's counsel then showed the court where Dr. Marble
discussed the issue in his report and the court overruled the objection of Mrs. Walker's counsel.
R. 941 at 70.
9.

On October 10, 2000, the court granted each party three peremptory challenges or

a total of nine peremptory challenges. R. 940 at 2. Mrs. Walker's counsel did not object. Id;
see also Mrs. Walkers' brief at 8.
10.

During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury panel, "[n]ow, have any jurors had

reservations about awarding damages instructed by the Court in the manner that you felt like
from the evidence of damages should be awarded for pain and suffering?" R. 940 at 72. "If
you'd have any problems following the instructions of the Court on that, please stand." Id. No
potential juror stood. Id.
11.

During the jury's deliberations, the jury sent a note with the following question,

"[w]ith the issue of pain and suffering, if some are against the principle of it, does that violate
instruction number three or any other instruction?" R. 913. The court then consulted with all
counsel and fashioned the following response, "[d]espite your personal views, you are required
to follow the instructions as given and are referred in particular to Instructions No. 2 and 34 in
this regard. On the issue of pain and suffering, after giving consideration to the evidence, you
may award as little or as much as you believe is appropriate consistent with Instruction 38. R.
701. The response was then initialed by the judge and all counsel and given to the jury. Id.
5

Mrs. Walker's counsel did not object to the response or the manner in which the court dealt with
the matter, but in fact, indicated that the "[cjourt's answer is something that I think is fair . . . . "
R. 942.
12.

Also during the trial, Ms. Hansen called Dr. Sawchuk to testify. Prior to the trial,

Ms. Hansen, Mr. Potkins, and R.T. Systems hired Dr. Sawchuk to perform a medical
examination of Mrs. Walker. While on the stand, Dr. Sawchuk was asked to testify about some
of his conclusions from his examination of Mrs. Walker. R. 941 at 8. On cross examination,
Mrs. Walker's counsel attempted to question Dr. Sawchuk about impairment ratings. R. 941 at
21-22, 36-37. Ms. Hansen's counsel objected on the basis that the question was beyond the
scope of direct examination. The court sustained the objection. Id Mrs. Walker's counsel then
requested to call Dr. Sawchuk as Mrs. Walker's witness. R. 941 at 38. The court told Mrs.
Walker's counsel that he could not because they did not designate Dr. Sawchuk as a witness. Id
Mrs. Walker's counsel responded that they did designate Dr. Sawchuk at a witness. Id The
court then recessed to determine whether Mrs. Walker's counsel had designated Dr. Sawchuk as
a witness. Id. at 38-39. After the recess, Walker's counsel did not pursue the matter any further,
preserve an objection, or attempt to resume questioning of Dr. Sawchuk on the issue in the
absence of a specific ruling from the court. Id Following Dr. Sawchuk's testimony, Mrs.
Walker's counsel indicated that Dr. Sawchuk could be excused. Id. at 58.
13.

On October 13, 2000, the jury returned a verdict that Ms. Hansen was 100% liable

for the accident and that Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems were not liable, at all, for the accident.
6

The jury awarded Mrs. Walker $30,000 in damages against Ms. Hansen. See, Special Verdict at
R. 703-05.
14.

On November 6. 2000, Mrs. Walker filed a Request for New Trial, or

alternatively, Request for Additur, arguing that the evidence supported a higher award and that
potential juror misconduct was not dealt with sufficiently. R. 710-25.
15.

On November 1, 2001, the court signed an Order denying Mrs. Walker's Motions

for New Trial or Additur. R. 910-15. The court ruled that the jury verdict was consistent with
the evidence presented at trial and that Mrs. Walker's argument regarding potential juror
misconduct was mistaken for various reasons. R. 913. First, jury question No. 2 from their
deliberations was ambiguous and given the circumstances and evidence presented at trial, it is
appropriate to assume the jury acted properly. Id. Second, Mrs. Walker's counsel was
consulted, participated in drafting, and did not object to the response, which was sent to the jury.
Id. Third and finally, the court could not grant a new trial based on juror misconduct because
Mrs. Walker failed to submit an affidavit from any one of the jurors as required by Rule 59, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
16.

Because the jury returned a verdict in an amount less than the Notice of Offer

filed by Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems, they sought post-offer costs in an amount of $3,556.19.
The court awarded Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems post-offer costs in the amount of $395.25. R.
875-79.
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17.

On November 1, 2001, the court entered a judgment in the case in the amount of

$20,648.45 in favor of Mrs. Walker and against Ms. Hansen. R. 920-22.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mrs. Walker did not preserve her peremptory challenge issue for appeal. While the
appellate court may, under certain circumstances, address an issue for the first time on appeal,
Mrs. Walker has not provided a statement of the grounds for seeking review of her peremptory
challenge issue, which was not preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 24, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. More importantly, in her brief, Mrs. Walker did not argue that the trial
court committed "plain error," as required to allow this Court to review her peremptory
challenge issue.
Mrs. Walker did not preserve her juror misconduct issue for appeal nor provide any
reason why this Court should address the issue despite her failure to preserve the issue for
appeal. Additionally, Mrs. Walker has not provided an affidavit from any juror in support of her
juror misconduct argument as required by Rule 59(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Whether the trial court erred in summarily granting a subrogation claim to reduce the
judgment awarded by the jury is not applicable to Defendants, Potkins and RT Systems.
Whether the trial court erroneously awarded defendant, Hansen, her taxable costs
incurred before her offer of judgment is not applicable to Defendants, Potkins and R.T. Systems.
The trial court did not err when it did not permit Mrs. Walker to call Dr. Sawchuk to
testify. In actuality, the trial court never made a definitive ruling on the issue and thus, the issue
8

is not appealable. Even in the event this Court entertains Mrs. Walker's appeal of the issue, Mrs.
Walker has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision substantially affected her rights or
the ultimate outcome of the trial.
The trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Marble to testify to matters regarding causation
because contrary to Mrs. Walker's position, Dr. Marble did not testify to any matter beyond the
scope of his report. Moreover, Mrs. Walker was given ample notice that Ms. Hansen planned to
have Dr. Marble testify at trial about causation.
ARGUMENT
A,

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR UNDER RULE 47(C), UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, IN AWARDING EACH DEFENDANT THREE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The trial court did not err under Rule 47(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in allowing

each defendant three peremptory challenges. More importantly, this Court should not address
this particular issue because Mrs. Walker did not preserve the issue for appeal nor provide any
reason why this Court should address the issue despite her failure to preserve the issue for
appeal.
Rule 24(a)(5)(A) & (B), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires Mrs. Walker to
either cite to the record "showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court," or provide "a
statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Rule
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, also mandates that Mrs. Walker's "argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
9

including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Rule 24 Utah R. App. P. 24 (emphasis
added).
Claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal. State v. Hoi gate, 10
P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). Two policy reasons support this rule. First, to give the trial court an
opportunity to address the claimed error and correct it if necessary and second, a party should not
forego making an objection with the strategy of enhancing its chances for success and then, if the
strategy fails, claim on appeal that the court should reverse. State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 232
(Utah 2002). A party is "not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit
of objecting on appeal." Id.
"Three exceptions to this general rule are recognized in Utah. An appellate court may
address an issue for the first time on appeal if appellant establishes that the trial court committed
'plain error,' if there are 'exceptional circumstances,' or in some situations, if a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised on appeal even though, by reason of the claimed
ineffectiveness, the matter was not raised below." State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
With respect to the first exception, Mrs. Walker has not provided a statement of the
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court as required by Rule 24,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. More importantly, in her brief, Mrs. Walker did not argue
that the trial court committed "plain error," as required to allow this Court to review her
10

peremptory challenge issue. Because Mrs. Walker failed to preserve the issue at trial and failed
to argue that the trial court committed "plain error" in her brief, Mrs. Walker has waived the
right to have this Court address the issue. Coleman ex rel Schefski v. Stevens, 17 P.3d 1122,
1124 (Utah 2000). Mrs. Walker has not raised either the second or third exceptions.
Given the foregoing, this Court should decline to address Mrs. Walker's peremptory
challenge issue and affirm the trial court on the issue.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING MRS. WALKER'S MOTION
FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON POTENTIAL JUROR MISCONDUCT
The trial court did not err in denying Mrs. Walker's Motion for a New Trial based on

potential juror misconduct. Similar to Mrs. Walker's peremptory challenge issue, she did not
preserve her juror misconduct issue for appeal nor provide any reason why this Court should
address the issue despite her failure to preserve the issue for appeal. Additionally, Mrs. Walker
has not provided an affidavit from any juror in support of her juror misconduct argument.
Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a new trial may be granted
for various reasons, including misconduct of the jury. However, under Rule 59(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, a motion for a new trial made under a claim of juror misconduct requires an
affidavit of any one of the jurors. "When the application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c)
(emphasis added).
Mrs. Walker argues that jury question No. 2 (the second question the jury sent out to the
court during deliberations) required the trial court to conduct a hearing based on McDonough
11

Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), to determine whether a juror failed
to honestly answer the voir dire question regarding damages for pain and suffering on the basis
that an honest response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.
Mrs. Walker did not object to how the trial court handled jury question No. 2, thus failing
to preserve the issue for appeal. In fact, Mrs. Walker's trial counsel is quoted in the record as
saying the "courts answer is something that I think is fair . . . . " R. 942 at 68-69. Additionally,
Mrs. Walker has failed to argue any exception that would allow this court to address her juror
misconduct issue. In its November 1, 2001, Order denying the plaintiffs Motion for New Trial
and Additur, the trial court reasoned:
The parties had ample opportunity to address any issued raised by that
note at trial, inasmuch as the jury's question was in writing and the
parties were consulted before the court returned a response to the jury.
Any action that plaintiff intended or desired to lake must have been taken
at that time. The court notes that it went to some pains to fashion an
appropriate response to the jury. Plaintiff made not request to the
court to engage in any inquiry regarding the nature of the jury's
comment, or to investigate the potential of any problem in the jury's
mindset or attitude. It is inappropriate and untimely for the plaintiff
to make an objection regarding that matter after the dismissal of the
jury and by way of post-trial motion.
R. 913. Not only did Mrs. Walker fail to object at the necessary time, she has also failed to raise
any exception in her brief that would allow this Court to address the issue.
Even if this Court were to address the issue, it is clear that the trial court's decision
should be affirmed. First, the trial court concluded that given the circumstances of the trial and
the evidence presented, it was appropriate to assume that the jury acted properly and that the note
12

was too ambigious to assume juror misconduct. R. 913. Moreover, the trial court properly held
that Mrs. Walker failed to abide by the rule relating to motions for new trials. Id.
Thus, whether or not this Court addresses Mrs. Walker's juror misconduct issue the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
C.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY GRANTING A
SUBROGATION CLAIM TO REDUCE THE JUDGMENT AWARDED BY THE
JURY DOES NOT APPLY TO THESE APPELLEES.
The issue above does not apply to Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems.

D.

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AWARD DEFENDANT,
HANSEN, HER TAXABLE COSTS DOES NOT APPLY TO THESE
APPELLEES.
The issue above does not apply to Mr. Potkins and R.T. Systems.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT ALLOWING MRS- WALKER TO
CALL DR. SAWCHUK TO TESTIFY
The trial court did not err when it did not permit Mrs. Walker to call Dr. Sawchuk to

testify. Mrs. Walker's counsel waived his right to call Dr. Sawchuck to testify on her
impairment rating, thus, is not appealable. Even in the event this Court entertains Mrs. Walker's
appeal of the issue, Mrs. Walker has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's decision
substantially affected her rights or the ultimate outcome of the trial.
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no
error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by
the court or by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
13

court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
Id. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in excluding proffered witnesses. Gerbich v.
Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah 1999). Moreover, an appellate court will not overturn a
trial court's ruling excluding proffered witnesses unless the "appellant demonstrates that the trial
court has overreached the broad discretion granted it and thereby affected the appellant's
substantial rights." Id.
Mrs. Walker's argument that the trial court erred when it did not permit her to call Dr.
Sawchuk, as her witness, should be denied and the decision of the trial court affirmed for two
reasons. First, the trial court did not deny Mrs. Walker the opportunity to call Dr. Sawchuk as
her witness. An examination of the record shows that Mrs. Walker's counsel clearly waived the
issue at trial. The record as it relates to this issue provides:
Mr. Fay: Okay. May I ask the court when I'm done with - when the
doctor is done as Mr. Davies' witness, if I may call him as the plaintiffs
witness.
The Court: You may not. You didn't designate him as your witness.
Of course not. We're in trial now, Counsel.
Mr. Fay: Your honor, I did designate him as a witness, and I filed a
pleading with the Court, with defense Counsel, asking him to be produced
today.
The Court: Is that correct, Counsel?
Mr. Davies: I don't recall whether he designated him or not, your Honor:
The Court: Lets take a recess.
14

Following the recess, during which the trial court and counsel for all parties attempted to
determine whether Mrs. Walker had in fact designated Dr. Sawchuk as a witness, Mrs. Walker's
counsel did not ask any further questions of Dr. Sawchuk, attempt to reassert his position that he
had designated Dr. Sawchuk as a witness, or object and preserve the issue for appeal. In fact,
Mrs. Walker's counsel, at the end of Dr. Sawchuk's testimony, stated that Dr. Sawchuk could be
excused. R. 941 at 58. As a result, Mrs. Walker's counsel waived his right to call Dr. Sawchuck
and the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion. Thus, the issue is not appealable.
Second, even if this court concludes the trial court did prevent Mrs. Walker from calling
Dr. Sawchuk as a witness, Mrs. Walker has not demonstrated that the trial court's ruling had any
effect on her substantial rights or the outcome of the trial. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
"to find that an error has affected the substantial rights of a party, [it] must consider the impact of
the error in the context of the whole proceeding." Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152,
1157 (Utah 1989); see, Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 609 P.2d 541, 548 (Utah 1984) (finding no
error in exclusion when evidence would have been cumulative), see, State v. Stephens, 667 P.2d
586, 588 (Utah 1983) (holding where evidence is excluded by the trial court, any error which
may have resulted from such exclusion is cured where the substance of the evidence is later
admitted through some other means).
Mrs. Walker contends that Dr. Sawchuk would have testified that she qualified for a 15%
impairment as a result of injuries suffered in the accident, which goes to the issues of causation
and damages. Mrs. Walker also contends that issues of causation and damages are vital in
15

negligence cases. However, Mrs. Walker failed to designate the entire trial transcript as part of
the appellate record. Without the entire trial transcript on appeal, this Court cannot determine
whether Mrs. Walker's substantial rights were violated, as the evidence she sought to introduce
may have been cumulative or admitted through some other means. Thus, Mrs. Walker has not
provided this Court with a sufficient record on appeal to determine whether the error affected a
substantial right and thus the trial court should be affirmed.
F.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING DR. MARBLE TO
TESTIFY TO MATTERS REGARDING CAUSATION
The trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Marble to testify to matters regarding causation

because contrary to Mrs. Walker's position, Dr. Marble did not testify to any matter beyond the
scope of his report. Moreover, Mrs. Walker was given ample notice that Ms. Hansen planned to
have Dr. Marble testify at trial about causation. Just as in the previous issue, Mrs. Walker must
prove that the trial court (1) abused its considerable discretion; (2) which resulted in an error that
was substantial and prejudicial; and (3) absent the error, there exists a reasonable likelihood that
a different result would have been reached. Stevenet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 977 P.2d 508
(Utah CtApp. 1999).
Dr. Marble did not testify to matters beyond the scope of his and the trial court's decision
to permit Dr. Marble to testify about causation was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court
previously ruled that Dr. Marble could "testify to whatever he said in [his] report." R. 940 at 25.
Mrs. Walker's argument that Dr. Marble's testimony about causation addressed matters beyond
the scope of his report is apparently based on the fact that his report did not include the word
16

"causation." However, Dr. Marble's report addressed substantive causation issues. Such was
confirmed when, after Mrs. Walker objected to the causation aspect of Dr. Marble's testimony,
the court requested to see the report to verify that those matters were indeed contained therein.
R. 941 at 70. The court, after reviewing the report, overruled Mrs. Walker's objection and
allowed Dr. Marble to testify to limited matters regarding causation. Id.
Mrs. Walker's position that Dr. Marble's testimony regarding causation constituted unfair
surprise is unsupported by the record. During Dr. Marble's second deposition, Ms. Hansen's
counsel specifically informed Mrs. Walker's counsel that they planned to have Dr. Marble testify
at trial about causation. Thus, Mrs. Walker's counsel was on notice that Dr. Marble would be
asked to testify about causation and any argument of unfair surprise by Mrs. Walker is
unjustified.
Given the foregoing, Mrs. Walker has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that Dr.
Marble's testimony resulted in substantial and prejudicial error and that absent the error, there
exists a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached.
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CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Mr Potkins and R.T. Systems move this Court for its
Order, denying Mrs. Walker's appeal and affirming the trial court.
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